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Abstract
Past evidence generally suggests that the presence of female directors on corporate boards 
tends to improve earnings quality due to these directors’ superior monitoring abilities. 
However, it is not clear which characteristics and skills of female directors drive such abili-
ties. In this paper, we focus on the financial background of female directors, an area which 
remains largely unexplored in existing literature. The results show that the participation of 
female directors with relevant financial background improves earnings quality more than 
the participation of female directors without such background. In addition, our findings 
suggest that only female directors possessing relevant financial background and having 
fewer outside directorships are able to mitigate earnings management and therefore over-
committing expert female directors with more outside directorships would diminish their 
monitoring ability. We did not find any evidence suggesting that female directors without 
relevant financial background are able to mitigate earnings management, irrespective of 
their outside directorships or tenure. We interpret our findings within a theoretical frame-
work that draws on a number of economic and social theories. The results are generally 
robust after controlling for potential endogeneity problems.
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1 Introduction
The findings of past studies generally suggest that female directors tend to have a posi-
tive effect on a number of corporate outcomes, performance and stock price informa-
tiveness (Carter et al. 2003; Gul et al. 2011, 2013; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Kirsch 2018). 
However, the precise channels through which female directors are able to improve 
shareholder value in corporate boardrooms are not clear to date (Adams and Ferreira 
2009). The central objective of this study, therefore, is to investigate whether it is the 
specialist skills and professional expertise (in this case, the financial background) of 
female directors that is associated with less earnings management rather than their gen-
der per se, or otherwise.
Meanwhile, gender diversity has received growing attention throughout the last dec-
ade and, in general, there is a global call for the presence of women on corporate boards 
as a means of improving corporate decision-making and governance (Adams and Fer-
reira 2009; Cumming et al. 2015; Nguyen et al. 2020). Some countries have initiated a 
spate of legislative changes requiring a predetermined representation of female direc-
tors on corporate boards (Terjesen et al. 2009; Terjesen and Sealy 2016). For instance, 
Norway requires 40% of women’s representation on corporate boards, with penalties 
for non-compliance. Following this, Spain and Sweden have considered female repre-
sentation on corporate boards of 40% and 25%, respectively and, consequently, the EU 
recently proposed women’s board representation of 25% for large listed firms (Terjesen 
et  al. 2009; Terjesen and Sealy 2016). A number of other developed and developing 
countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and India, amongst others, have adopted 
or proposed similar quotas for women (Khlif and Achek 2017; Kirsch 2018) and, in the 
US, there has been a growing presence of female directors over the last two decades, 
although the appointment of female directors is still voluntary (Catalyst Group 2004).
The appointment of female directors is not only of great interest to policy-makers, 
politicians and regulatory authorities, but also to management, finance and accounting 
researchers. In addition, the appointment of women to corporate boards is perceived to 
be ethically appropriate and socially responsible corporate behavior (Owhoso 2002). On 
the other hand—and constituting the focus of our study—is that extant research shows 
that women have different characteristics and skills compared to men (e.g., more vigi-
lant and risk-averse, cautious, conservative, fair, independent, objective and responsi-
ble) which place them in a better position to intensely monitor executives compared 
with the position of male directors (Daily and Dalton 2003; Rose 2007; Adams and Fer-
reira 2009; Bear et al. 2010; Gul et al. 2011; Srinidhi et al. 2011). In this case, we argue 
that female directors are not only more likely to challenge managerial opportunism, but 
also will be better at doing so than their male counterparts (Valenti 2008; Labelle et al. 
2010; Sun et al. 2011; Capezio and Mavisakalyan 2016; Lara et al. 2017).
Indeed, the results of a few studies indicate that female directors tend to have a posi-
tive influence on a number of corporate outcomes, such as earnings management and 
performance (Carter et  al. 2003; Gul et  al. 2011; Kirsch 2018; Nguyen et  al. 2020; 
Zalata et  al. 2019a, b). Nevertheless, earnings management is an important issue that 
has long plagued corporations, and continues to pose major concerns for the broader 
society. A priori and due to their superior monitoring abilities (based on the predic-
tions of economic theories), we expect that the presence of female directors on audit 
committees to restrain earnings management and improve the overall earnings quality. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between female directors and earnings management is a 
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relatively under-examined issue and the results of the few studies that have attempted 
to address this question are generally inconclusive (e.g., Srinidhi et al. 2011; Sun et al. 
2011; Lara et al. 2017).
While these studies examined whether the participation of female directors is associ-
ated with earnings management, they assumed that women are a homogeneous group and 
have not delved into their intra-differences. One of these differences is their financial back-
ground and, therefore, our study goes beyond mere female participation in the audit com-
mittees to argue that the association between female directors and earnings management 
might be largely contingent on their financial background.1 Arguably, improving financial 
reporting quality is partially dependent on directors’ financial background (Li et al. 2012). 
Theoretically (based on economic and social predictions), while female directors might 
have strong motivation to constrain opportunistic actions, we argue that they may fail to do 
so effectively because they may lack the technical financial background required for over-
seeing the preparation of firms’ financial reports, and in conducting in-depth discussions 
with managers or external auditors.
Whilst affirmative governance reforms around the world seem to be moving towards 
allocating more seats to female directors (Gul et  al. 2013), they, surprisingly, are rela-
tively silent about female directors’ financial background. Consequently, we aim to shed 
light on an important policy question of whether it is merely female directors’ presence 
per se on audit committees or their professional expertise and skills (i.e., financial back-
ground) that matters. We, thereby, aim to provide new insights that might encourage regu-
lators to go beyond gender quotas and prioritize the recruitment of females with a financial 
background.
Using a sample of US firms, we found evidence that the participation of female directors 
on audit committees is associated with less earnings management. Furthermore, our addi-
tional analysis suggests that this finding is mainly driven by female directors with financial 
background. However, on average, we did not find evidence that female directors without 
financial background play significant role in mitigating earnings management. Interest-
ingly, our supplementary analysis suggests that there are other factors that influence female 
directors, including their firm-related experience (tenure) and their outside directorships. 
We found that holding at least three other outside directorships (busy directors) tends to 
have a negative impact on the effectiveness of female directors with financial background. 
In particular, we found that busy female directors possessing relevant financial background 
are less likely to constrain earnings management than their rivals with a maximum of two 
other outside directorships. In addition, while we find that female directors with either 
long or short tenure mitigate earnings management, this finding is more pronounced with 
long-tenure female directors possessing relevant financial background. That is, it seems 
that long-tenured female directors with financial expertise are better able to maintain their 
independent judgment over time and less likely to develop professional affinity with their 
management team. Finally, we found no evidence suggesting that female directors with-
out financial background are able to mitigate earnings management, irrespective of their 
1 We focus on female directors on the audit committees for two main reasons. First, with the goal of 
improving earnings quality, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) stressed the importance of having 
financially experienced audit committee members. Second, since audit committee members, are directly 
responsible for monitoring the integrity of financial statements, comparing female directors with and with-
out financial background on the board (irrespective of their participation on the audit committees) might 
bias the results as some females without financial background on the board have no role in monitoring 
financial reporting integrity.
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outside directorships and tenure. We interpret our findings within a theoretical framework 
that draws on a number of economic and social theories.
This study contributes to the extant research in a number of ways. First, it provides new 
insights on the crucial policy debate relating to board gender diversity and earnings man-
agement. While extant literature suggests that the participation of female directors within 
boardrooms is associated with less earnings management, our analysis extends this lit-
erature by documenting that improved earnings quality can be better achieved if female 
directors have financial background. We hope that our findings will serve as a motivation 
for boards of directors to pay more nuanced consideration to appointing female directors 
with financial background in order to create value for their shareholders. Second, our extra 
analysis highlights the importance of other outside directorships that female directors with 
financial background would mutually hold. In particular, our findings suggest that holding 
more outside directorships would impact negatively on the ability of female directors pos-
sessing relevant financial background in constraining earnings management. That is, firms 
might give a preference to female directors with less outside directorships and particular 
attention might be given to busy female directors. Finally, our findings have an important 
implication for regulators as well. They suggest that the mere presence of female directors 
per se on corporate boards does not necessarily improve firms’ earnings quality; instead, it 
demonstrates that firms with female directors who have financial background exhibit bet-
ter earnings quality. This suggests that recent legislative changes requiring blanket female 
director quotas within boardrooms should go beyond this and incorporate and focus more 
on female directors with reasonable financial background.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical framework, 
reviews the literature on gender diversity and outlines our research question. Section 3 dis-
cusses the research design, and data. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present and discuss the empirical 
findings. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2  Theoretical framework and literature review
2.1  Theoretical framework
Recently, the number of female directors has been steadily increasing, although it is still 
relatively low, and currently most firms do have female directors on their boards (Wil-
liams 2003; Gul et  al. 2011). Arguably, the appointment of female directors is likely to 
enhance board independence and improve the shareholder value in many ways. It is widely 
accepted that gender differences do exist and, given this, economic (e.g., agency, behav-
ioral, economics, organizational and psychology theories) and social (e.g., ethical, moral 
development and social role theories) theoretical literature provides persuasive evidence 
that females might have better skills than their male counterparts. For example, and from 
the perspectives of agency and organizational theories (Lara et al. 2017), the appointment 
of female directors would facilitate more informed decisions, enhance the decision-mak-
ing process, and improve communication among board members (Daily and Dalton 2003; 
Rose 2007; Bear et al. 2010).
In addition, and from moral development (Kohlberg 1984) and social role theory view 
(Chizema et al. 2015), female directors can enhance the depth and breadth of discussion 
and deliberations, particularly those related to challenging issues (Stephenson 2004; Huse 
and Solberg 2006; Srinidhi et  al. 2011). For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue 
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that because female directors do not belong to ‘old-boy’ networks, they are more likely to 
provide greater oversight, monitoring and independent thinking expected from independent 
directors. Similarly, and based on behavioral, organizational and psychological theories, 
female directors tend to exhibit better board attendance, adopt strong monitoring positions, 
and demand greater accountability from CEOs for bad performance (Gul et al. 2011). This 
close monitoring would not only help in reducing the information asymmetry at the board 
level, but also encourage more public disclosure by curbing managers’ use of insider infor-
mation to their own benefit (Gul et al. 2011; Srinidhi et al. 2011), which would constrain 
managers’ opportunism.
Another theory (drawing insights from behavioral, economic and psychology theories) 
underpinning female directors’ monitoring efficacy is that female directors are more con-
servative and risk-averse than their male counterparts are (Powell and Ansic 1997; Mar-
tin et al. 2009; Huang and Kisgen 2013; Faccio et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2016; Harris et al. 
2019; Kao et al. 2020; Zalata et al. 2019a; Tang et al. 2020) and, therefore, they are less 
likely to allow managerial opportunism for fear of being caught. In addition, based on 
social (e.g., ethical, moral development and social role theories) theories—female directors 
are more ethically sensitive than male directors (i.e., Owhoso 2002; Simga-Mugan et al. 
2005; Lund 2008; Ibrahim et  al. 2009; Wang and Clift 2009; Sarin and Wieland 2016) 
and, thus, they are less likely to be tolerant of managerial opportunism than male directors 
are. Finally, female directors tend to confer greater importance on ‘communal values’, such 
as altruism, benevolence, caring, communication, consensus building, empathy, generos-
ity and trust, while maintaining good relationship with others in general (Kohlberg 1984; 
Eagly 2009). By contrast, male directors have been shown to prefer ‘agentic values’, such 
as achievement, confidence, control and power (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Chizema et al. 
2015). Meanwhile in Adams and Ferreira’s (2007) theory of friendly boards, directors who 
are more articulate, caring, empathetic and trustworthy are more likely to be effective at 
gaining the trust of executives and, therefore, more successful at performing their strate-
gic counselling and advisory roles. Consequently, female directors’ superior possession of 
these ‘soft’ skills (e.g., caring, communication and trustworthy) also implies that their abil-
ity to perform their role will be better than male directors.
2.2  Literature review
Extant research already supports the fact that female directors may have superior moni-
toring ability compared with male directors and firms with female representatives do 
outperform their rivals (e.g., Carter et  al. 2003; Erhardt et  al. 2003; Adams and Fer-
reira, 2004, 2009; Kao et al. 2020). Nevertheless, there is a dearth of studies examin-
ing the influence of gender-diversity on earnings and accounting quality. For instance, 
Gul et  al. (2011) suggest that female directors enhance the information environment. 
Also, Gul et al. (2013) find that gender diversified boards are associated with accurate 
analysts’ forecasts. For earnings management, two recent studies provide inconclusive 
findings. While Sun et al. (2011) find that gender diversified audit committees have no 
impact on constraining earnings management, Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that firms with 
women representatives on the audit committee exhibit higher earnings quality. Lara 
et al. (2017) show that female directors only mitigate earnings management in firms that 
discriminate against women’s participation, while this relationship disappears in other 
firms. Zalata et al. (2019b) suggest that only female directors playing monitoring role 
improve earnings quality. Finally, focusing on blatant cases of manipulation, Cumming 
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et al. (2015) find that the presence of female directors on a sample of Chinese corporate 
boards helped reduces the probability of fraud.
So far, these studies assume that all female directors are able to constrain managers’ 
opportunistic behaviors. However, one problem such studies share is the ambiguity of 
the explanations offered as to why female directors mitigate earnings management. Gen-
der studies are often criticized because such observed earnings quality might be attrib-
uted to other unobservable factors, such as knowledge disparities (Francis et al. 2014). 
Nevertheless, an unresolved research question is whether gender per se underpins why 
female directors are efficient monitors and, therefore, mitigate earnings management. 
Alternatively, this should be complemented by financial background if we really hope to 
garner the benefits of female directors.
For directors to be efficient monitors of managers, Beekes et al. (2004) argued that 
they should have a sufficient monitoring incentive and understand the consequences of 
financial reporting decisions. Economic and social theory, on the other hand, suggests 
that while female directors have sufficient monitoring incentives, they would understand 
the outcomes of financial reporting decisions better if they have a financial background. 
This is because the financial background enables directors to deal with the complexity 
of financial reporting, understand the financial reporting decisions, understand auditors’ 
judgment, and support auditor in auditors-management disputes (Kalbers and Fogarty 
1993; DeZoort and Salterio 2001; Mangena and Pike 2005; Zhang et al. 2007; Li et al. 
2012). Extant empirical literature shows, for example, that directors’ efficacy is partially 
dependent on their experience (Faleye et al. 2018; Al Lawati et al. 2021), which plays 
a crucial role in constraining aggressive accounting practices. In essence, Xie et  al. 
(2003), Abbott et  al. (2004), Bedard et  al. (2004), Dhaliwal et  al. (2010), and Bado-
lato et al. (2014) find that firms with more outside directors possessing relevant finan-
cial background are characterized by less earnings management and less probability of 
financial reporting restatement.
As such, the findings of the financial background literature raise a valid concern of 
whether it is the gender of audit committee members that matters or whether it is their 
financial background. This is an important and timely research question since many 
countries have imposed regulations on companies to allocate some board seats to female 
directors. However, these regulations do not require specific expertise of female direc-
tors. Among these, the most salient expertise in assuring effective monitoring is the 
ability to interpret the outcomes of firms’ financial reporting decisions. In the mean-
time, it may be that extant regulations endorse firms to recruit female directors with 
limited experience just for legitimacy reasons and comply with current rules which, in 
turn, might undermine the value of female directors and jeopardize corporate govern-
ance improvements.
We acknowledge that, given the gender differences, female directors are better able to 
create value for shareholders than their male counterparts are. Nevertheless, despite the 
benefits of appointing female directors, the current study contends that not all of them 
would be able to constrain earnings management; instead, we argue that female directors 
with relevant  financial background could play a more effective monitoring role in con-
straining managerial opportunism than other female directors would. That is, building on 
extant research, the current study aims to investigate whether it is gender per se that has an 
impact on earnings management. Alternatively, female directors serving on the audit com-
mittees should be equipped with the relevant financial background. It is essential to under-
stand such an impact when evaluating the desirability of legislation focusing on female 
background.
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3  Method and data
3.1  Emprical model
To investigate whether female directors affect earnings management, we use discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for these practices. Discretionary accruals can be defined as the extent 
to which accruals embedded in earnings are opportunistically used by management (Jones 
1991). In order to reach a measure for discretionary accruals (DACC ), we draw on prior 
studies and use the performance-adjusted Jones (1991) model as follows,
where WCA is working capital accruals measured as the (change in current assets—change 
in cash and short-term investment)—(change in current liabilities—change in the current 
portion of long-term debt). AT is total assets. Adj_SALES is change in sales less changes 
in accounts receivable, and ROA is the return on assets measured as the net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by lagged assets. We then calculate the discretionary accrual 
(DACC ) for each firm as the residuals from Eq. (1) estimated annually for each two-digit 
SIC industry with at least 20 observations.2 In addition, the following model is then used in 
testing our research question:
where ABS_DACC is the absolute value of DACC . FEMEX is the proportion of audit com-
mittee female directors with relevant financial background, whilst FEMINEX is the propor-
tion of audit committee female directors without relevant financial background. We follow 
Armstrong et al. (2015) who define financial expert directors based on the definition pro-
vided by the ISS database, which is consistent with SOX and SEC definitions. In essence, 
we follow the ISS definition because Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Hsu et al. (2018) highlight 
the importance of directors’ diversified skills, as well as in order for our analysis to be con-
sistent with SOX and SEC regulatory language. To test our research question, the current 
study focuses on the coefficients β1, and β2 and they are expected to be negative and signifi-
cantly different. Although we focus on female directors with relevant financial background 
(FEMEX), one might argue that male directors with relevant financial background are also 
associated with the level of earnings management and, therefore, we control for male direc-
tors with such financial background (MELEX). In addition, we control for other observable 
corporate governance variables that might influence the level of earnings management. In 
particular, we control for audit committee size (ACSIZE) and percentage of independent 
directors (IND).
Extant research also suggests that external auditors influence firms’ ability to manage 
their earnings, and therefore we control for external auditor quality (BIG4). We also control 
(1)WCAi,t∕ATi,t−1 = 0 + 11∕ATi,t−1 + 2Adj_SALESi,t∕ATi,t−1 + 3ROAi,t , + it,
(2)
ABS_DACC = 0 + 1FEMEX + 2FEMINEX + 3MALEX
+ 4ACSIZE + 5BIND + 6BIG4
+ 7SIZE + 8LEV + 9OCF + 10ROA + 11MBV
+ 12LOSS + 13LNOA + 14TREM,
2 Our calculation for discretionary accruals starts by running model (1) at industry-year level and therefore 
we require at least 20 observations for each industry-year in order to ensure sufficient observations for the 
coefficients’ estimations.
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for other firms’ characteristics that might influence earnings management. In particular, 
we control firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), operating cash flows (OCF), return on assets 
(ROA), market to book value (MBV), last year net operating assets (LNOA) and real earn-
ings management (TREM). All variables are defined in “Appendix A”.
3.2  Sample
Since financial background data became available on ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) from 
2007, our sample starts from 2007 and runs to 2013. We obtain the required financial data 
from the annual Compustat File. Given the differences in financial reporting requirements 
between financial and non-financial sectors, reflecting extant research, we exclude financial 
firms from our sample. In addition, we exclude firms with missing financial data required 
to run our expectation models and calculate other control variables. Furthermore, we 
exclude non-financial industries with observations of less than 20 firm-year observations in 
order to avoid bias in estimating discretionary accruals and to ensure an adequate number 
of observations to run our expectation models. After obtaining measure of discretionary 
accruals, we merge our financial data with the corporate governance and financial expert 
data obtained from the ISS database and we exclude firms with missing corporate govern-
ance data. The final sample is 5398 firm-year observations.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics for 
the full sample
All variables’ definitions are given in “Appendix A”
Variables Mean Median SD Q1 Q3
ABS_DACC 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08
FDIR 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.25
FEMEX 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
FEMINEX 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
MALEX 0.44 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.67
ACSIZE 3.71 4.00 0.90 3.00 4.00
IND 0.79 0.80 0.11 0.71 0.88
BIG4 0.92 1.00 0.26 1.00 1.00
SIZE 7.71 7.51 1.55 6.57 8.70
LEV 0.50 0.28 0.92 0.01 0.63
OCF 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.17
ROA 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.11
MBV 2.95 2.22 2.69 1.45 3.46
LOSS 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00
LNOA 0.70 0.54 0.57 0.33 0.86
TREM − 0.03 − 0.01 0.47 − 0.24 0.21
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4  Results
4.1  Descriptive statistics
We summarize the descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table  1. These show that 
female directors with  relevant financial background represents, on average, 5% of audit 
committees members, while female directors without financial background represents 7%, 
demonstrating insignificant differences in the representation of female directors both with/
out financial background on audit committees. In addition, we split our full sample into 
two groups based on the presence of at least one female director serving on the audit com-
mittee and report the descriptive statistics for these two groups in Table 2. These show that 
our sample comprises 2169 firm-year observations, or 40% of the full sample, with at least 
one female director serving on their audit committees. We delve into these firms in greater 
detail and find that almost 81% of these 2169 observations have only one female director 
serving on their audit committees. Therefore, it seems that female directors are still under-
represented on firms’ audit committees and the time has come to call for new rules regu-
lating the participation of female directors on audit committees, particularly those with a 
financial background. Table 2 shows that the mean of ABS_DACC is 0.06 for firms with at 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics comparing firms with at least one female director serving on the audit com-
mittee and firms with no female directors serving on the audit committee
Column one reports the mean, median and standard deviation using a sample of firms with at least a female 
director serving on the audit committee, Column two reports the same statistics using a sample of firms 
with no female directors serving on the audit committee, and the last column reports the statistical differ-
ences between these two samples
All variables’ definitions are given in “Appendix A”
Variables Firms with at least one female 
director (N = 2169)
Firms with no female director 
(N = 3229)
Test of difference 
between means
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-statistic P value
ABS_DACC 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.11 3.4575 0.0005
MALEX 0.36 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.33 0.33 15.7440 0.0000
ACSIZE 4.06 4.00 0.96 3.47 3.00 0.78 − 24.6728 0.0000
IND 0.81 0.83 0.10 0.77 0.80 0.11 − 12.8262 0.0000
BIG4 0.98 1.00 0.15 0.89 1.00 0.31 − 12.0368 0.0000
SIZE 8.16 8.02 1.61 7.41 7.23 1.42 − 18.0510 0.0000
LEV 0.63 0.39 1.05 0.41 0.21 0.81 − 8.7785 0.0000
OCF 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.09 1.5659 0.1174
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 − 0.9495 0.3424
MBV 3.20 2.31 3.11 2.78 2.16 2.36 − 5.6798 0.0000
LOSS 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.35 1.8307 0.0672
LNOA 0.67 0.51 0.58 0.72 0.57 0.57 2.8978 0.0038
TREM − 0.02 − 0.01 0.47 − 0.03 − 0.01 0.48 − 1.0482 0.2946
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least one female director compared with 0.07 for firms with male directors. Univariate tests 
of difference show that firms with male directors have significantly higher ABS_DACC 
than those firms with at least one female director serving on a firm’s audit committee.3 
Also, the table shows significant differences between these two groups in terms of ACSIZE, 
IND, BIG4, SIZE, LEV, MBV, LOSS and LNOA.
Furthermore, we classify firms with at least one female representation on their audit com-
mittee into two groups based on the financial background of their female directors; namely, 
firms with at least one female director possessing relevant financial background (N 1023 with 
89% of them only having one FEMEX) and firms with at least one female director without 
relevant financial background (N = 1146). The descriptive statistics for these are reported 
in Table 3 and interestingly, consistent with our expectation, it shows that these two groups 
are significantly different in respect to ABS_DACC . Finally, Table 3 indicates that these two 
groups differ significantly in respect to ACSIZE, BIG4, SIZE, LOSS, LNOA and TREM.
We present Pearson Correlation Matrix between all variables used in our analysis in 
Table 4. In support of our expectation, it shows a negative association between ABS_DACC 
and FEMEX, while the relationship between ABS_ADACC and FEMINEX is negative, but 
insignificant. In addition, as reported in Table 4, it seems that our analysis does not suffer 
from any potential multicollinearity problems.
Table 3  Descriptive statistics comparing firms with at least one female director with Financial Expertise 
Serving on the audit committee and firms with at least one Female Inexpert Directors Serving on the Audit 
Committee
Column one reports the mean, median and standard deviation using a sample of firms with at least one 
female director having relevant financial background serving on the audit committee, Column two reports 
the same statistics using a sample of firms with at least one female director, but having no financial back-
ground serving on the audit committee, and last column reports the statistical differences between these two 
samples
All variables’ definitions are given in “Appendix A”
Variables Firms with at least one female 
director with relevant financial 
background (N = 1023)
Firms with at least one female 
inexpert and no female expert 
(N = 1146)
Test of difference 
between means
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-statistic P value
ABS_DACC 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.11 2.6830 0.0074
MALEX 0.42 0.50 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.22 − 9.4480 0.0000
ACSIZE 3.96 4.00 0.92 4.15 4.00 0.98 4.6030 0.0000
IND 0.81 0.83 0.10 0.81 0.83 0.10 0.6167 0.5375
BIG4 0.98 1.00 0.12 0.97 1.00 0.17 − 2.1746 0.0298
SIZE 8.35 8.29 1.56 7.99 7.82 1.64 − 5.2201 0.0000
LEV 0.63 0.45 0.95 0.64 0.35 1.13 0.1098 0.9126
OCF 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.4147 0.6784
ROA 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 − 0.6159 0.538
MBV 3.13 2.35 2.91 3.27 2.25 3.27 1.0636 0.2876
LOSS 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.14 0.00 0.35 1.7590 0.0787
LNOA 0.71 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.53 − 3.3299 0.0009
TREM − 0.05 − 0.03 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.47 2.6727 0.0076
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to the fact that our large sample 
size might drive this significant difference.
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4.2  Multivariate analysis
Table 5 presents our regression analysis with ABS_DACC as a dependent variable. In addi-
tion to investigating whether the financial background of female directors impacts their 
ability to mitigate earnings management, this study uses the current sample to confirm 
the results found in extant literature regarding the association between all types of female 
directors and ABS_DACC . Therefore, we run two alternative regressions with two different 
Table 5  Panel A: Regression estimates of discretionary accruals and female directors
Panel A contains regression estimates of discretionary accruals on female directors and other control var-
iables. Under column 1, we regress discretionary accruals on all non-executive  female directors serving 
on the audit committee and other control variables. Under column 2, we regress discretionary accruals on 
female directors with and without financial background serving on the audit committee and other control 
variables. In Panel B, we test the significant differences between the coefficients on FEMEX, FEMINEX & 
MALEX
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively
All variables’ definitions are given in “Appendix A”
Variables Column 1 Column 2
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
FDIR − 0.022 − 2.10**
FEMEX − 0.051 − 3.82***
FEMINEX − 0.010 − 0.69
MALEX − 0.007 − 1.15
ACSIZE − 0.005 − 2.68*** − 0.006 − 3.04
IND 0.007 0.44 0.008 0.51
BIG4 − 0.002 − 0.30 − 0.002 − 0.22
SIZE − 0.002 − 1.81* − 0.002 − 1.48
LEV − 0.012 − 5.05*** − 0.011 − 4.96***
OCF 0.160 5.89*** 0.158 5.82***
ROA − 0.052 − 1.38 − 0.051 − 1.36
MBV 0.006 5.60*** 0.006 5.53***
LOSS 0.010 1.53 0.010 1.55
LNOA − 0.001 − 0.36 − 0.001 − 0.35
TREM 0.019 4.33*** 0.018 4.28***
_CONS 0.064 4.53*** 0.062 4.33***
Year fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 9.51% 9.67%
F-statistic 12.73 11.53
Number of Observations 5398 5398
Panel B: Testing the significant differences between the coefficient on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
FEMEX = FEMINEX 0.041 F = 5.81
Prob > F = 0.0161
FEMEX = MALEX 0.044 F = 10.55
Prob > F = 0.0012
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measures of female directors. In the first regression, similar to prior studies, we use a meas-
ure that captures all types of non-executive female directors (FDIR) serving on audit com-
mittees, while in the second regression, we divide them into two groups.4 The first group 
includes female directors with relevant financial background (FEMEX), while the second 
group refers to female directors without financial background (FEMINEX).
The estimated coefficient on FDIR, as presented in Table 5 under column 1, is negative 
and significant at 5%, thus supporting the proposition that firms with female directors are 
more likely to report higher earnings quality. Interestingly, as reported under column 2 of 
the Table 5, while the coefficient of female directors having relevant financial background 
(FEMEX) is negative and significant at 1%, there is insignificant relationship between 
ABS_DACC and female directors without relevant financial background (FEMINEX). This 
result suggests that earnings management is lower in firms with female directors having 
relevant financial background. Furthermore, Panel B of Table 5 suggests that the coeffi-
cient on FEMEX is significantly lower than that of FEMINEX, and thereby suggesting that 
FEMEX has greater impact upon firms’ earnings management than FEMINEX has. Inter-
estingly, it seems that FEMEX has more profounded impect on earnings management than 
their male counterparts (MALEX) as reported in Panel B of Table 5.
Taken together, the results presented in Table  5 demonstrate that the financial back-
ground of female directors  play a critical role in improving earnings quality. Particu-
larly, these results provide considerable evidence suggesting that female directors with 
relevant financial background are associated with smaller discretionary accruals, thereby 
implying that these directors mitigate financial reporting opportunism in their firms.
So far, our analysis focuses on the impact of female directors serving on audit commit-
tees on accruals-based earnings management. Instead of using financial reporting judge-
ments, managers might also inflate their earnings using other business decisions (real 
earnings management), such as offering excessive price discount or lenient credits, over-
production or cutting their discretionary expenses, such as R&D (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Cohen et  al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Francis et  al. 2016; Liu 2020). Therefore, 
we go further and investigate whether the financial background of female members serv-
ing on the audit committees has an impact on these types of earnings management. One 
might argue that it is reasonable to extend our reported findings in Table 5 to real earnings 
management.
Nevertheless, audit committee members are responsible for monitoring the integrity of 
financial statements and for reviewing firms’ financial reporting judgements and since real 
earnings management does not represent a violation of GAAP, it may not be subject to 
audit committee monitoring responsibilities. In addition, unlike accruals-based earnings 
management, real earnings management is related to routine business decisions undertaken 
throughout the year and arguably outside directors have less information about day-to-day 
operations (Osma 2008). That is, female directors on the audit committee have less scope 
to impact real earnings management. In order to investigate this proposition, we replace 
ABS_DACC with TREM and its three components. We report this analysis in Table 6 and 
our findings suggest that both FEMEX and FEMINEX has less impact on real earnings 
management (earnings management using business decisions). As discussed above, we 
believe that this finding might be due to the fact that the audit committee members directly 
monitor financial reporting decision instead of business decisions, and therefore their value 
is more prominent with discretionary accruals. Given the dearth of this theoretical and 
4 The rest of the analysis will use this measure.
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empirical support for the relationship between real earnings management and FEMEX and 
FEMINEX, our subsequent analyses will focus on discretionary accruals.
5  Further analysis
5.1  Female directors’ characteristics
While our analysis suggests that female directors with financial background play a crucial 
role in ensuring the integrity of financial reports, we have assumed that female directors 
with relevant financial background are homogeneous and have so far ignored the fact that 
they should devote sufficient time to their firms’ financial reporting issues. In this section, 
we go beyond their financial background and consider other factors that might influence 
their ability to oversight the financial reporting process. In particular, we focus on the out-
side directorships and tenure of female directors with relevant financial background.
5.1.1  Outside directorships
Arguably, holding outside directorships would improve directors’ monitoring skills. In par-
ticular, this would enhance their experience and knowledge about corporate governance 
practices in other unaffiliated firms. That is, these directors represent important sources 
that facilitate the flow of strategic knowledge among boards and, therefore, enhance board-
monitoring effectiveness (Fama and Jensen 1983). In addition, these directors are more 
concerned about protecting their reputation and fear of any potential litigation and, con-
sequently, directors with outside directorships are more likely to perform their duties dili-
gently for fear of losing current and future outside directorships if their firms engaged in 
earnings management (Helland 2006; Sharma and Iselin 2012). On the other hand, direc-
tors with more outside directorships might devote insufficient time required to perform 
their duties  at each firm, which in turn affect the quality of their oversight. The Profes-
sional Organization for Non-Executive Directors (PONED) recommends that directors 
should devote at least two days weekly to each firm that they serve on its board. That is, 
they should serve on a maximum of two other non-affiliated firms. The empirical findings 
of Beasley (1996) confirm the PONED recommendation/endorsement. However, it is not 
clear how the outside directorship affects the monitoring quality of female directors with 
relevant financial background.
Therefore, as a further analysis, we classify  female directors with relevant  finan-
cial background into two groups—directors who serve on at least three corporate boards 
(FEMEX _OUT) and directors who serve on less than three corporate boards (FEMEX _
LESS_OUT). Similarly, we classify female directors without such financial background in 
the same way (FEMINEX _OUT and FEMINEX _LESS_OUT). We report the findings of 
this analysis in Table 7 under column (1). Our findings show that while the coefficient on 
FEMEX _OUT is positive and significant at 10%, the coefficient on FEMEX _LESS_OUT 
is negative and significant at 1%, therefore suggesting that the outside directorships have a 
negative impact on female directors’ ability to effectively constrain earnings management. 
Thus, while it is desirable to appoint female directors with the required financial back-
ground, firms might impose some restrictions on their outside directorships. In addition, 
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female directors without financial background (FEMINEX_OUT and FEMINEX_LESS_
OUT) are still not able to mitigate earnings management, irrespective of their outside 
directorships.
5.1.2  Tenure
Long serving period on the board and its committee may help directors to become an effec-
tive monitoring mechanism and protect shareholders’ interests. This is because longer 
period serving on the committee will increase directors’ knowledge and experience; there-
fore, they may become familiar with their organization’s resources, with its methods of 
operations, technology, and culture (Singh and Harianto 1989; Yang and Krishnan 2005). 
Aldefer (1986) found that long-serving board members share a common understanding 
about their functions and companies’ operations, while new directors need to wait before 
making any significant contribution in order to learn about their firms’ organizational prac-
tices. In addition, during their tenure, these directors might receive some job training that 
would equip them with essential expertise, which can complement their financial back-
ground. In addition, short-tenure directors are more likely to be nominated and appointed 
by the current CEO and, therefore, these directors are more likely to have amiable and 
interdependent relationships with the current CEO, which might compromise their inde-
pendence (Sun and Cahan 2009; Sun et al. 2009). This implies that long periods of serv-
ing on the board and its committees can improve the directors’ accumulated experience 
and enhance their ability to challenge managers’ financial reporting decisions. On the other 
hand, Beasley (1996) argues that new directors might be more independent from manage-
ment and more vigilant, while directors who have served for long periods on the board 
might develop close ties with management and therefore new directors are more likely to 
be independent relative to directors with long tenure. However, Bedard et al (2004), Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) and Zalata and Roberts (2016) find that earnings management is less 
pronounced in firms with long-tenure directors. Consequently, we argue that as the period 
served on the board and its committees increase, the female directors with the required 
financial background may become more knowledgeable of firms’ different practices and 
are therefore better able to deal with complicated financial reporting decisions, including 
earnings management. That is, we expect that the impact of female directors with rele-
vant financial background to be more prominent when they serve on firms’ board for a long 
period.
To investigate this conjecture, we classify female directors with relevant financial back-
ground using their tenure into two groups—namely, short (FEMEX_SHORT_TEN) and 
long tenure (FEMEX_LONG_TEN). We classify them as having a short tenure if their ten-
ure is eight years or less, and a long tenure if their tenure is more than 8 years.5 Simi-
larly, we classify female directors without financial background in the same way (FEM-
INEX_SHORT_TEN and FEMINEX_LONG_TEN). The results of this analysis are reported 
in Table 7 under column (2). These results show that both long- and short-tenure female 
directors possessing relevant financial background (FEMEX_LONG_TEN and FEMEX_
SHORT_TEN) constrain earnings management. However, consistent with our expectation, 
Panel B shows that the coefficient on both long- and short-tenure female directors with 
relevant financial background is significantly different, suggesting that the impact of female 
5 Eight years is the median of directors’ tenure in ISS database.
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directors with relevant  financial background is more pronounced when they have long 
tenure. In other words, it seems that long-tenure female directors with relevant financial 
background are less likely to develop affiliations with the management team and, therefore, 
are better able to maintain their independent judgment. Finally, female directors without 
such financial background (FEMINEX_SHORT_TEN and FEMINEX_LONG_TEN) are not 
able to mitigate earnings management, irrespective of their tenure.
6  Robustness analysis
6.1  Controlling for endogeneity
The results reported under the main analysis might be subject to potential self-selection 
bias if earnings management and female directors are endogenously determined, and thus 
any conclusion drawn from our model could be misleading. Therefore, to deal with any 
potential endogeneity problems, we use three well known methods: (i) the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), (ii) the two-stage Heckman model, and (iii) propensity score matching.
First, when using 2SLS method, we should first find relevant instrumental variables. 
In essence, under this approach, we use two instrumental variables that do not influence 
earning management, but might affect our main independent variables (FEMEX and FEM-
INEX). Following Srinidhi et  al. (2011), our first instrument is the percentage of female 
directors within the industry. Our second instrument is female directors with financial 
background to male directors with financial background participation ratio in the industry 
where the firm operates. If this ratio is high, firms would have a large pool of good female 
directors possessing relevant financial background from which they can choose the best 
candidates for their board. That is, the higher this ratio, the greater the participation of 
female directors with financial background.
The results of the 2SLS analysis are reported in Table 8 and, as expected, the first-stage 
regression indicates that our instruments are significantly related to FEMEX and FEM-
INEX. In addition, the F-statistic value is higher than the recommended value of 10 and the 
F-Test of excluded instruments is 25.41 and 20.92, respectively. In addition, Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic is 69.643, which is higher than Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values of 
7.03, and therefore suggests that our instruments are valid. Finally, the second-stage regres-
sion still shows that female directors with relevant financial background (FEMEX) are able 
to significantly mitigate earnings management. Interestingly, it shows that the coefficient 
on female directors without financial background (FEMINEX) becomes significant at 5%, 
indicating, therefore, that both types of female directors might have the same directional 
impact on earnings management because both of them  share some inherited soft skills, 
such as risk aversion and ethical behavior among others, which might enhance their behav-
ior towards earnings quality. However, Panel B of Table 8 still shows a significant differ-
ence between the coefficients on FENEX and FEMINEX, therefore reinforcing the impor-
tance of female directors’ financial background.
Second, the current study uses a two-stage model as developed by Heckman (1976) to 
address possible endogeneity problems. While in the first-stage model, we compute the 
inverse Mills ratio (MILLS), in the second stage, we add MILLS as an additional control 
variable in Eq.  (2). More specifically, in the first stage, we run a probit model capturing 
the determinants of appointing female directors on the audit committee and these include 
firm size, firm age, return on assets, sales growth, Tobin’s Q, annual stock return, and audit 
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Table 8  Panel A:  Regression estimates of discretionary accruals and female directors (Controlling for 
Endogeneity; 2SLS)
Panel A: contains regression estimates of discretionary accruals on female directors with and without finan-
cial background and other control variables using 2SLS regression. Under column 1, we report regression 
estimates of the first stage using FEMEX as dependent variables and under column 2, we report regression 
estimates of the first stage using FEMINEX as a dependent variable. Under column 3, we report our second 
stage regression of discretionary accruals on female directors with and without financial background after 
correcting for potential endogeneity concerns. In Panel B, we test  the significant differences between the 
coefficients on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively
All variables’ definitions are given in “Appendix A”








Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient z-statistic
FEMALE_INDU-
TRY 
− 0.050 − 0.56 0.609 6.41***
WO_EX_to_ME_
EX
0.410 7.08*** − 0.190 − 3.37***
FEMEX − 0.863 − 5.90***
FEMINEX − 0.309 − 2.14**
MALEX − 0.069 − 6.08*** − 0.103 − 11.72*** − 0.097 − 4.11***
ACSIZE − 0.010 − 2.85*** 0.013 3.93*** − 0.009 − 2.17**
IND 0.037 1.31 0.056 2.02** 0.046 1.41
BIG4 0.028 3.28*** 0.035 4.53*** 0.031 2.46**
SIZE 0.013 4.82*** 0.004 1.86* 0.011 3.07***
LEV 0.007 1.72* 0.006 1.79* − 0.002 − 0.35
OCF − 0.034 − 0.85 − 0.023 − 0.60 0.110 2.52**
ROA − 0.007 − 0.18 − 0.019 − 0.47 − 0.059 − 1.15
MBV − 0.002 − 1.03 0.000 − 0.17 0.004 2.15**
LOSS 0.002 0.19 0.007 0.92 0.011 1.12
LNOA − 0.004 − 0.68 − 0.013 − 2.50** − 0.013 − 1.98**
TREM − 0.006 − 1.12 0.005 0.79 0.012 2.06**
_CONS − 0.102 − 3.95*** − 0.115 − 4.36*** − 0.039 − 1.16
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES
Adj_R2 11.57% 12.58% − 70.81%
F-statistic 17.04 18.74 9.63









Panel B: Testing the significant differences between the coefficient on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
FEMEX = FEM-
INEX
0.554 chi2 = 10.55
Prob > chi2 = 0.0012
FEMEX = MALEX 0.766 chi2 = 33.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gender diversity and earnings management: the case of female…
1 3
committee size.6 In addition, we control for the percentage of female directors within the  
industry and female directors with financial background to male directors with financial 
background participation ratio in the industry. We present the results of the second-stage 
regression in Table  9 under column 1, and these still suggest that female directors with 
relevant financial background (FEMEX) have more prominent impact on earnings manage-
ment than female directors without such financial background (FEMINEX).
Finally, our last method to address potential endogeneity concerns is the propensity 
score-matching technique. We first transfer our main independent variables (FEMEX and 
FEMINEX) into dummy variables and then run a logit regression to predict the probability 
of appointing female director with financial expertise using the same variables included in 
Eq. (2). We use the predicted values obtained from this regression to match firms hiring 
FEMEX with others without FEMEX. Using these procedures, we find 909 matches for 
each observation with FEMEX. We then use both samples (firms with FEMEX and their 
matches) with total observations of 1,818 to re-estimate Eq. (2) and report this analysis in 
Table 9 under column 2. We follow the same procedures for each firm with FEMINEX and 
get matches of 1045 firm-year observations. Using both samples with total observations of 
2090, we re-estimate Eq. (2) and report the findings in Table 9 under column 3. The results 
still offer support for our main conclusions and, therefore, our findings do not appear to be 
subject to significant endogeneity concerns.
6.2  The presence of female directors with and without financial background
Under the main analysis, female directors with relevant  financial background and those 
without financial background have been measured as a continuous variable. However, 
when the percentages are used, a higher percentage might represent either a larger number 
of female directors or a smaller number of total directors with the same number of female 
directors. Therefore, as a robustness analysis, the mere presence of the female directors 
with relevant financial background is used.7 In particular, an indicator variable is set to 1 
if the audit committee includes at least one female director with relevant financial back-
ground; and zero otherwise. Similarly, under this analysis, an indicator variable is set to 1 
if the audit committee includes at least one female director without financial background; 
and zero otherwise. We report the findings of this analysis in Table 10 and they still sup-
port the main proposition of this study that female directors with relevant financial back-
ground are better able to maintain and improve earnings quality.
6 Firm age is measured as the number of years during which COMPUSTAT reports a firm’s total assets 
since 1977. Sales growth is measured as change in sales scaled by last year sales. Tobin’s Q is measured as 
(total assets—common equity + equity’s market value) ÷ total assets. Stock return is measured as stock price 
at year end minus stock price at the beginning of the year divided by stock price at the beginning of the 
year. Other variables are as defined in “Appendix A”.
7 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this concern.
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6.3  Subgroup analysis
6.3.1  Financial crisis
Our sample covers the period 2007–2009, namely the financial crisis period. Arguably, cri-
sis time is characterised by intense public scrutiny over financial reporting practices and 
shareholders are more concerned about firms’ financial position (Filip and Raffournier 
2014; Arthur et al. 2015). The financial crisis impacted negatively on investors’ confidence 
and indeed, during this time, most investors were eager to sell their shares, which thereby 
Table 11  Panel A: Regression estimates of discretionary accruals and female directors (Global financial cri-
sis)
Panel A: contains regressions estimates of discretionary accruals on female directors with and without rel-
evant financial background and other control variables. Under column 1, we regress discretionary accruals 
on female directors with and without financial background using the financial crisis sample and under col-
umn 2, we regress discretionary accruals on female directors with and without financial background using 
the post financial crisis sample. In Panel B, we test the significant differences between the coefficients on 
FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively




Post financial crisis time
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
FEMEX − 0.048 − 2.95*** − 0.050 − 3.11***
FEMINEX − 0.037 − 2.84*** 0.007 0.33
MALEX − 0.013 − 1.59 − 0.004 − 0.58
ACSIZE − 0.004 − 1.62 − 0.007 − 2.78***
IND 0.006 0.34 0.011 0.48
BIG4 − 0.009 − 1.10 0.003 0.35
SIZE 0.000 − 0.15 − 0.003 − 1.63
LEV − 0.008 − 3.65*** − 0.013 − 4.28***
OCF 0.121 4.30*** 0.176 4.44***
ROA − 0.073 − 1.96* − 0.033 − 0.60
MBV 0.004 4.02*** 0.007 4.84***
LOSS 0.004 0.56 0.014 1.60
LNOA − 0.011 − 3.45*** 0.004 1.00
TREM 0.011 2.93*** 0.023 3.62***
_CONS 0.071 4.70*** 0.050 2.64***
Year Fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 7.77% 10.10%
F-statistic 7.43 11.38
Number of Observations 1882 3516
Panel B: Testing the significant differences between the coefficient on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
FEMEX = FEMINEX 0.011 F = 0.46
Prob > F = 0.4985
0.057 F = 6.36
Prob > F = 0.0118
FEMEX = MALEX 0.035 F = 4.14
Prob > F = 0.0423
0.046 F = 8.06
Prob > F = 0.0046
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led to sharp drop in share prices. This can engender some firms to respond by engaging in 
opaque financial reporting practices in order to mitigate the significant drop in share prices 
(Trombetta and Imperatore 2014). As such, if female directors, especially those with finan-
cial background can really protect shareholders’ interests, then, arguably, the financial cri-
sis period is the real time where their assurance over the financial reporting integrity might 
be most needed. Consequently, it is worth investigating whether there are significant dif-
ferences between the impact of female directors during and after the global financial crisis.
In order to investigate this question, we split our sample into two periods, global 
financial crisis period (2007–2009) and post crisis period (2010–2013) and run Eq.  2 
separately for these two samples. Results reported in Table 11 under column (2) dem-
onstrate that, in the post financial crisis period, the results are qualitatively similar to 
our main analysis. Interestingly, during the financial crisis time, our findings reported in 
Table 11 under column (1) reveal that both types of female directors mitigate earnings 
management, and the significant difference between them disappear. Arguably, during 
the financial crisis period, companies’ financial reporting practices were under intense 
scrutiny from regulators and the general public, and therefore, it seems that both types 
of female directors, as risk averse directors, were more likely to challenge firms’ oppor-
tunistic practices.
6.4  Meeting earnings benchmarks
Our analysis focuses, so far, on all sample and ignores the possible managerial incen-
tives behind earnings management. Arguably, firms are more likely to engage in earn-
ings management to meet earnings benchmarks (e.g., avoid reporting earnings decrease) 
or to smooth their earnings. For instance, prospect theory suggests that users of financial 
information are more sensitive to negative numbers than positive numbers and therefore 
managers are motivated to report increase in their earnings. Indeed, extant research sug-
gests that market participants and therefore, stock prices are sensitive to earnings bench-
marks (Barth et  al. 1999; Jiang 2008). In other words, stock market seems to reward 
(penalize) firms that meet/beat (miss) earnings benchmarks. As such, some firms might 
engage in earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks and therefore escape from 
being penalised by the market. One might argue that female directors might allow earn-
ings management to avoid any potential costs (i.e., stock price downgrade). On the other 
hand, extant studies suggest that investors naively fixate on reported earnings and can-
not see through earnings management (e.g., Sloan 1996; Xie 2001; Beneish and Vargus 
2002). Since the value of female directors stems from the fact that they protect share-
holders against managerial opportunism, we believe that if female directors really add 
value to their firms, then, they should spend much time and effort in a sample of firms 
that report earnings’ increase in order to ensure that these firms report genuine earnings. 
Therefore, it is an empirical question of whether female directors, especially those with 
relevant financial background, tolerate or mitigate earnings management when it allows 
firms to meet earnings benchmark.
In order to investigate this question, we repeat our analysis using two subsamples; a 
sample of firms that reported earnings increase and a sample of other firms. We report 
the findings of this analysis in Table 12 under column 1 and it seems that female directors 
with relevant financial background does not tolerate earnings management even if it allows 
firms to avoid reporting earnings decrease. Furthermore, in order to provide sharper test 
of our proposition, instead of focusing on all firms that beat the benchmark regardless of 
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the extent by which they did so, we focus on firms that narrowly beat the benchmarks (i.e., 
firms reporting increase in their net income scaled by lagged total assets between 0 and 
1%). We report this analysis in Table 12 under column 2 and the results are qualitatively 
similar.
6.5  Income smoothing
Managers might also use their discretion to smooth the fluctuations in their reported earn-
ings (Beidleman 1973) and thereby help investors to better predict future earnings and 
Table 13  Panel A: Regression estimates of discretionary accruals and female directors (Income smoothing)
Panel A: contains regressions estimates of discretionary accruals on female directors with and with-
out  financial background and  other control variables. Under column 1, we regress discretionary accruals 
on female directors with and without financial background using a sample of firms that deemed to have 
smoothed their income and under column 2, we regress discretionary accruals on female directors with and 
without financial background using a sample of other firms. In Panel B, we test the significant differences 
between the coefficients on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in a two-tailed test, respectively





Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
FEMEX − 0.074 − 3.05*** − 0.045 − 2.91***
FEMINEX 0.000 − 0.02 − 0.011 − 0.73
MALEX 0.004 0.30 − 0.011 − 1.56
ACSIZE − 0.004 − 1.03 − 0.006 − 3.15***
IND − 0.013 − 0.46 0.019 1.03
BIG4 − 0.001 − 0.12 − 0.001 − 0.12
SIZE − 0.006 − 2.10** − 0.001 − 0.86
LEV − 0.009 − 1.81* − 0.012 − 4.57***
OCF 0.116 2.26** 0.178 5.63***
ROA − 0.002 − 0.03 − 0.061 − 1.54
MBV 0.007 3.21*** 0.005 4.70***
LOSS − 0.018 − 1.49 0.014 2.07**
LNOA 0.004 0.65 − 0.002 − 0.71
TREM 0.033 4.14*** 0.013 2.63***
_CONS 0.100 3.55*** 0.048 3.12***
Year fixed effect YES YES
Adj_R2 12.29% 9.02%
F-statistic 4.76 9.46
Number of observations 1349 4049
Panel B: Testing the significant differences between the coefficient on FEMEX, FEMINEX & MALEX
FEMEX = FEMINEX 0.074 F = 4.94
Prob > F = 0.0266
0.034 F = 3.17
Prob > F = 0.0752
FEMEX = MALEX 0.078 F = 8.22
Prob > F = 0.0043
0.034 F = 5.17
Prob > F = 0.0231
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probably reduce risk premium and cost of equity (Trueman and Titman 1988; Francis et al 
2004; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Given such benefits, one might argue that female direc-
tors serving on audit committees might allow managerial discretion that may be aimed at 
dampening possible fluctuations in earnings. On the other hand, earnings smoothing can 
indeed be costly. For instance, since managers’ view of what may be considered to be 
acceptable financial reporting decisions can be different from regulators’ view, Badertscher 
et al. (2012) and Baik et al (2020) noted that managerial discretion, even non-opportunistic 
discretion, might increase the probability of restatements and thereby litigation cost. As 
such, female directors may mitigate discretionary accruals even if it is conducted in order 
to smooth earnings, otherwise they may lose their reputation or probably their job if such 
practices were detected by regulators.
To investigate this proposition, we re-run Eq. 2 using two subsamples; income smooth-
ers firms and other firms. We define the firm as income smoother if the ratio of its standard 
deviation of operating cash flows to its standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary 
items is in the highest quintile.8 Where cash flows and earnings are scaled by lagged total 
assets. Our results reported in Table 13 suggest that FEMEX mitigate discretionary accru-
als in both samples, demonstrating again that the value of these directors is not contin-
gent of the motivation behind earnings management and indeed they mitigate discretionary 
accruals even when it is conducted to apparently smooth earnings.
6.6  Other measures
Under the main analysis, we use performance-adjusted discretionary accruals to get a 
proxy for earnings management. Extant studies also use a measure of earnings manage-
ment based on Accruals Estimation Errors (AEE) measured using the expectation model 
proposed by McNichols (2002) as follows,
where WCA is working capital accruals and OCF refers to cash flows from operations in 
years t, t − 1, and t + 1. ΔSALES refers to the change in sales. The AEE for each firm is then 
estimated as the residuals from Eq. (3) run annually for each two-digit SIC industry with 
at least 20 observations. Using the absolute value of AEE as a measure of earnings quality, 
un-tabulated results still suggest that only female directors with financial background sig-
nificantly mitigate earrings management.
7  Conclusion
The extant studies demonstrate that the presence of female directors on corporate boards 
can enhance earnings quality. However, they assume that female directors are homogene-
ous and, therefore, they have not delved into the interpersonal differences within female 
(3)
WCAi,t∕ATi,t−1 = 0 + 1OCFi,t−1∕ATi,t−2 + 2OCFi,t
+ ATi,t−1 + 3OCFi,t+1∕ATi,t + 4ΔSALESi,t∕ATi,t−1 + it,
8 Arguably, having higher standard deviation of cash flows from operations than the standard deviation of 
earnings is consistent with income smoothing and therefore in order to provide sharper test we consider 
firms in the highest quintile to have used greater accounting discretion. We calculate rolling three-year 
standard deviation for each firm year observation.
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directors as a group. For instance, there might be differences between female directors not 
only in the stance they take towards managerial opportunism, but also in terms of their 
financial expertise (Sun et al. 2011). That is, while female directors might have a strong 
motivation to constrain managerial opportunism, they might lack the required financial 
expertise to perform this function. Therefore, drawing unique insights from a number of 
economic and social theories, and a large sample of US firms, this study examines whether 
gender per se has a real impact on earnings quality, or alternatively, whether it is the female 
directors’ financial expertise that matters. Unlike prior studies, the current study splits 
female directors into two groups based on their financial background.
The results suggest that it is not gender difference that improves earnings quality; 
instead, it is female directors’ financial background that seems to drive earnings quality. In 
particular, similar to prior studies, this study finds some evidence that high earnings quality 
is a characteristic of firms with a high proportion of female directors. However, when clas-
sifying female directors based on their financial background, the results show that earnings 
quality is significantly associated with female directors with relevant financial background. 
We do not find similar results for female directors without financial background, and there-
fore suggesting that results of prior studies are driven by female directors with financial 
background. Our results are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity concerns.
These findings have important implications for users of financial statements. In par-
ticular, users of financial statement should take into account female directors’ background 
and the industries in which their firms operate. Furthermore, these results would provide 
important additional inputs to policy-makers in countries imposing a predetermined per-
centage of female representation on the boards of their corporations. In particular, regula-
tors in these countries should consider the female directors’ financial background when 
setting affirmative targets relating to gender representation on corporate boards.
This study, however, is subject to some limitations. In particular, although we provide 
some evidence on the role of female directors with financial expertise in enhancing earn-
ings quality, our research design does not show the mechanism(s) that they use to improve 
earnings quality. Future research might investigate this research gap. In addition, ISS does 
not provide full data relating to the type of financial background, and therefore our analy-
sis does not differentiate between accounting and non-accounting financial background.9 
Finally, our sample only comprises US firms over the period 2007–2013, and it is not clear 
whether the current findings can be generalized to other countries or other time periods. 
Arguably, the participation of female directors on audit committees is increasing, and 
therefore, more up to date data would potentially enrich current knowledge of, and under-
standing about, the impact of female directors on earnings management in particular and 
other corporate outcomes in general. Therefore, future studies may offer new insights by 
conducting their analyses using firms from different contexts and countries, as well as over 
extended or different time periods.
Appendix A
See Table 14.
9 Arguably accounting background might have a more pronounced impact (Dhaliwal et al. 2010; Hsu, et al. 
2018; Chen et al. 2020).
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Table 14  Variable definitions
Variables Operationalization
Dependant variable
ABS_DACC Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using Eq. 1
Main independent variables
FDIR The proportion of non-executive female directors on the audit committee to 
the total number of audit committee members
FEMEX The proportion of non-executive female directors with relevant financial 
background on the audit committee to the total number of audit committee 
members
FEMINEX The proportion of non-executive female directors without financial back-
ground on the audit committee to the total number of audit committee 
members
Control variables
MALEX The proportion of non-executive male directors with relevant financial 
background on the audit committee to the total number of audit committee 
members
ACSIZE The total number of audit committee members
IND The proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors on 
the board
BIG4 Indicator variable taking the value of one if the external auditors is one of the 
big 4 audit firms and zero otherwise
SIZE The natural logarithm of firms’ market capitalization
LEV The proportion of long-term debt to total book value of common equity
OCF Cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets
MBV The proportion of firms’ market capitalization to book value of common equity
LOSS Indicator variable set to one if net income before extraordinary items is a 
loss, and zero otherwise
LNOA Lagged net operating assets measured as net operating assets divided by 
sales. Net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities. Operating assets is calculated as total assets less cash 
and short-term investment. Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets 
less total debt, less book value of common and preferred equity, and less 
non-controlling interests
TREM Total real earning management measured as abnormal production 
cost + (− 1) × abnormal cash flows + (− 1) × abnormal discretionary 





t−1 = 0 + 11∕ATt−1 + B2SALESt∕ATt−1
+ 3ΔSALESt∕ATt−1 + 4ΔSALESt−1∕ATt−1 + eit,
where 
PROD is the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory. AT is total 
assets; SALES is sales and ∆SALES is change in sales




t−1 = 0 + 11∕ATt−1
+2SALESt∕ATt−1 + 3ΔSALESt∕ATt−1 + eit
 where OCF is 
operating cash flows




t−1 = 0 + 11∕ATt−1 + 2SALEST∕ATt−1 + eit,where DISEX is as 
the sum of selling, general and administrative, R&D and advertising expenses. 
We set R&D and advertising expenses to zero if they are missing. These three 
expectation models estimated using at least 20 industry-year observations
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